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Parental Libality for Torts
of Children
By ALICE B. FRmm*
A child is responsible for his torts or delinquent acts., Today
many states, as a condition of probation, order children to make
restitution for damages which resulted from their delinquent acts.
Thirty-five states2 have passed laws placing an absolute liability
on the parent for damages resulting from the delinquent acts of
his child (see Appendix) in amounts ranging from $100 to $750.
As far as is known, no study has been made relative to the effect-
iveness of such laws or to what extent they have been used.
The common law doctrine is that a parent is not liable for
the torts of his minor child, on the basis of meer relationship.3
The civil law doctrine is that a parent is liable for the torts of
his minor child unless the parent was unable to prevent the child's
act or the child himself was under the legal age of responsi-
bility.4
In numerous situations, the civil law provides for redress
against parents for damages resulting from their children's torts;
for example, where the child is acting as the agent of the parent,
or commits a tort within the scope of an employment relation-
ship with the parent, or in situations where the parent has been
negligent in the control of the child, such negligence being the
proximate cause of the damage, and in other situations where the
parents have entrusted dangerous instruments to their children.'
* Program analyst, Office of the Director, Division of juvenile Delinquency
Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
I Brown v. Dellinger, 855 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1963). Minor seven and eight
years of age held civilly liable for their own torts and summary judgment for
damages caused by fire, upheld.
noes not include Ohio which places liability on parents of an adjudicated
delinquent in certain instances. Ohio Code Supp. 1963, 2151.411.
3 Prosser, Torts § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
4 See Stone, Liability for Damage Caused by Minors, A Comparative Study,
5 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 6, (1952).5 n Roca v. Steinrnetz, 61 Cal. App. 102 (1923), the parents were held
liable as they had provided the child with a dangerous instrument.
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Minors may be held civilly liable for their torts. A juvenile
court has no civil authority in such matters. Generally, the juris-
diction of the juvenile courts over parents is extremely limited.
The court can assess payment for parental support to institutions
maintaining a child and can proceed against parents in a con-
tempt action for failure to heed a court order of support. Juvenile
courts cannot, without enabling legislation, render a civil judg-
ment against parents for persons seeking damages for wrongs
committed by minors. Juvenile courts may, however, order resti-
tution to a victim, as a term of a minor's probation.
Social aspects and legal aspects of parental liability for the
torts of a child warrant serious deliberation of legislation which
imposes such liability. Present day vandalism has led to legisla-
tion which imposes restitution upon the child and/or responsi-
bility upon the parent. Some laws are concerned primarily with
destruction of school property, other laws place absolute re-
sponsibility upon the parents for the acts of their children. Parents
in general do not condone the delinquent acts of their children
such as vandalism, unauthorized use of cars, assault or breaking
and entering; nor can parents; without proof of negligence,
usually be held liable by mere notice or information of such acts.
Two mid-nineteenth century cases stated the civil law posi-
tion. In one" it was held "A father is not liable for the torts of
his children, committed without his knowledge or consent, and
not in the course of his employ" and anothere held it is a rule
of common law that a father is not liable in damages for the
torts of his child committed without his knowledge, consent,
participation or sanction, and not in the course of his employ-
ment of the child. Knowledge by the father of the boy's careless
use of a shot gun created liability in this case, however.
There has been a trend in recent years which tends by legis-
lation and case decisions to hold parents liable for injurious,
destructive and malicious acts of their children on the basis of
parental relationship although at common law such relation-
ship was not considered as a basis for imposing liability. The
parental liability statutes which have been enacted, with but one
exception-the State of Tennessee-place an absolute financial
( Wilson v. Garrard, 59 III. 51 (1871).
7 Paulin v. Howser, 63 Ill. 312 (1872).
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responsibility upon parents without regard to fault or negligence.
The trend in the civil law leans towards an assumption that the
parents lacked control or guidance over the child who commits
a tortious act.
In California parental liability for the torts of children was
enacted by statute in 1955. Prior to that time, minors themselves
were liable for torts and mere relationship did not impute
liability.
In Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d. 679
(1953), the complaint alleged that parents employed the plaintiff
as babysitter for a four year old son; that the parents knew and
failed to warn the sitter that the son habitually engaged in vio-
lently attacking and throwing himself against other people.
Shortly after the plaintiff entered the home the child attacked her
and injuries resulted. The court held the complaint stated a cause
of action for negligence against the parents on the grounds that a
parent may become liable for an injury caused by a child where
the parents' negligence made it possible for the injury to occur.
In 1963 Governor Brown of California vetoed a legislative
bill which would have extended parental liability for wilful
misconduct of a minor to include injury to property and to in-
crease limitation of liability from $300 to $1,000.8
In Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1961), a father
was held liable to the sum of $300 for damages to a car stolen
by his son. The act which authorized such recovery was held
constitutional with the court declaring that legislative bodies
in enacting parental liability statutes had decided "it is better that
the parents of these young tort feasors be required to compen-
sate those who are damaged even though the parents be with-
out fault, rather than to let the loss fall upon innocent victims.""
In a number of cases the courts seem to have difficulty in
finding a basis for parental liability beyond mere relationship,
which at common law does not make the parent liable as such.1"
8 "While I agree with the aim of this legislation, to generate a higher degree
of supervision by parents over the actions of their children with respect to
vandalism and physical attacks," Governor Brown declared, "I cannot consent to
the enforcement of such a high maximum where no fault is required to be shown
on the part of the parent." From the State Capitals, Aug. 12, 1963.
9 Court made reference in its decision to 37 Texas L. Rev. 924 and 3 Viii.
L. Rev. 529.
10 See Minick v. Luchy, 87 Pac. 1141 (Kan. 1919); Capps v. Carpenter 283
Pac. 655 (Kan. 1930).
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There is, however, an affirmative duty on the parent to make him
liable when he has failed to exercise proper parental control
over a bullying child."-
In Bieker v. Owens, 850 S.W.2d 522 (Ark. 1961), it was held
that a parent has responsibility to control minor children while
they are in their formative years. The court emphasized that
where the parent has the opportunity to control a minor, and
knowledge of the tendency of the minor to commit acts which
could be injurious to others, and having such opportunity has
failed to exercise reasonable control, the parent should be made
to respond to those who have been injured by such acts of the
minor.'"
In a recent case, General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259
N.C. 317, 180 S.E.2d 645 (1963), North Carolina became the
third state to uphold the constitutionality of parental liability
statutes.' 3 An eleven year old, living with his parents, was ad-
mitted to have maliciously and wilfully set fire to school furnish-
ings causing damage in the amount of almost $3,000. The plain-
tiff insurer, as subrogee to the school, brought action for $500,
the maximum limit under the North Carolina Statute. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina conceded that the statute
reversed the established common law rule, whereby parents were
not liable for the torts of their children, but held that such statute
was not a failure of due process of law under state or federal
constitutions.
In Board of Educ. v. Hansen, 56 N.J. Super. 567, 153 A.2d
393 (1959), a public school student and his parents were jointly
sued by reaosn of statutory liability for damages to school prop-
erty-in this instance in the amount of $344,000 for damages
caused by setting fire to the school. The court held that the
statute in question was in derogation of the common law and
should be strictly construed, but was not unconstitutional as
11 In a leading case, Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1930) the court
said, "while it is true that parents are not liable for torts committed by their
minor children without their consent or knowledge yet the principle applicable...
is that the parents are liable if it appears that they knew that their child was
guilty of committing the particular kind of tort habitually.., and made no effort
to correct or restrain him."12 Also, Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962), and
Bocock v. Rose, 373 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1963).
13See Kelly v. Williams, 366 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), and
Board of Educ. v. Hansen, 56 N.J. Super. 567, 153 A.2d 393 (1959).
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depriving parents of their property without due process of law.
In this case there would have been no liability if the Hansen
boy were not a "pupil" of the public school system. The liability
comes about by reason of the provisions of the statute, a condi-
tion under which free public education becomes available. In
sending their son to public school, the parents became amend-
able to the liability of the statute.14
In Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N.Y. Supp.
147 (1937), a child was held liable for injuries to another child
caused by negligent use of a bicycle, but the parents of the de-
fendant were absolved of liability because of insufficient evi-
dence of knowledge of child's careless operation of his bicycle.
Unless made so by statute, the court found there is no liability
on the part of a parent as such for the tort of a child. A child is
in general liable for his own torts, absent the parents' negligence,
consent, knowledge, or participation.
The rule is stated in 39 Am. Jur. Parent and Child § 58 (1938):
Although there are some decisions which have failed to recog-
nize this principle, the general rule is that a parent may be
liable for the consequence of failure to exercise the power
of control which he has over his children, where he knows,
or in the exercise of due care, should have known, that in-
jury to another is a probable consequence. Thus a father may
be held liable where he knows that a tortious act is in con-
templation, or that his children are persisting in a course of
conduct likely to result in injury to another. Failure to re-
strain the child, it is said, amounts to a sanction of or consent
to his acts by the parent. It is questionable whether mere
knowledge by the parent of his child's mischievous or reck-
less disposition is enough to make him liable for torts of the
child. Certainly where there is nothing to show any knowl-
edge and therefore any approval by the parent of a line of
conduct on the part of the child, the parent is not liable.' 5
14The Annual Report of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Essex
County, New Jersey (1955) states that "a search of the records discloses no
single case where any New Jersey school board over the past fifty-two years has
in fact made use of this statute by filing suit against a parent. If the psychological
effect of this law had real value then we could have long since expected an ab-
sence or a dimunition of such vandalism. This, however, does not seem to be
the case."
15 See, Condel v. Savo, 850 Pa. 350, A.2d 51 (1944), 155 A.L.R. 81 where
the parents knowledge of their son's habit of beating smaller children was sufficient
to charge the parents with negligence for which they may be answerable for
injuries caused by such tortious act. And, Bateman v. Crim, 34 A.2d 257 (D.C.
(Continued on next page)
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In Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 185, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962), the
case involved a practical joke which caused unintended injury
to the plaintiff when the eleven year old son of the defendant
sprung a trap mechanism purporting to release a live mongoose.
Defendant's actions in encouraging her son was held sufficient
to incur liability. A parent is liable for act of his child if parents'
conduct was such as to render his own negligence proximate
cause of the injury complained of-based on the ordinary rules
of negligence and not upon the parental relationship. 6
16 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 68 (1938) says, "As a general rule a parent
The cases cited herein hold the parent liable in a civil action
for a child's tortious act.. . as distinguished from cases in which
a juvenile court with a limited jurisdiction over parents, imposes
liability upon parents for vandalism or other delinquent acts of
a minor child.
Several questions concerning the proper interpretation of
statutory vicarious liability of parents could be raised. Are foster
parents and prospective adoptive parents similarly liable for the
child's tortious act? 17 If the child is at a resident school or camp
when the tortious act is committed does parental liability still
exist? Is the plaintiff in a parental liability action precluded from
recovery of greater amount than the statutory maximum?
Further questions could be raised on the efficacy of parental
liability statutes. Has a "Let's get tough with parents" attitude
actually reduced juvenile delinquency?' 8
Bar associations, state officials, the National Council of Juve-
nile Court Judges 9 and civic organizations have issued strong
statements of caution on the legislative imposition of vicarious
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Cir. 1943), which held the negligence of the parents must have some specific
relation to the tortious act, thus the parental supervision or lack of it was held
to be a question for jury to determine.
may be liable for an injury which is caused directly by the child, where the
negligence of the parent has made it possible and probable that such injury would
occur. .. . Generally speaking liability of the parent is based on the rules of
negligence rather than the relationship of parent and child. . . . The distinction
has been made that any liability of the parent is for his own fault and not for
the fault of the child and the fact that the child is liable for the particular tort
does not prevent the imposition of liability on the parent for his negligence with
respect to such tort."
17 See, Landers v. Medford, 13 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 1963) wherein a stepfather
was held not liable for minor's conduct.
I8 See, Jhan and June Robins, Punishing Parents Dosen't Workl This Week
Magazine, February 3, 1957; and Note, 36 Wash. L. Rev. 328 (1961).
19 See The Seattle Times, June 28, 1961, p. 9, col. 2.
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liability of parents for the tortious acts of minor children. One
state official, Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois, in vetoing parental
liability legislation said in his message,
This Bill makes parents or legal guardians of minor children
under the age of 18 liable for damage to property inflicted
by their children when the children are acting maliciously or
wilfully. The Bill authorizes an action at law in any court
of competent jurisdiction; and it places a limit of $300 on the
amount of damages which may be recovered.
Under Illinois law the courts have consistently held that
parents are liable for torts committed by their minor children
only under certain circumstances: when the children were
acting at the direction of the parents or in furtherance of the
parents' business. The Bill is intended to extend parental re-
sponsibility to all cases of property damage where the child
is acting wilfully or maliciously.
There appears to be no valid reason to expand this area
of tort liability only in cases of injury to property. If the
existing law of parental liability is to be expanded, it should
also encompass injury to persons.
Moreover, the Bill might also serve in one important respect
to restrict existing law by placing a limitation of $300, re-
gardless of actual damages, on the amount that might be
recovered in those cases where the Illinois courts have held
parents liable. Thus, the parents of a child operating an auto-
mobile so negligently as to be wilful might-because the child
is found to have been acting in furtherance of his parents'
business-be held liable for only a fraction of actual damages
inflicted.
For these reasons, I veto and withhold my approval of
House Bill No. 191.20
Governor Averell Harriman of New York said on similar legis-
lation,
This Bill provides that parents shall be liable for damage
done by a child up to $250. It was passed after spirited debate
and discussion, and has been the subject of unusual contro-
versy. The vote in the Senate was very close.
Both the proponents and the opponents of the legislation
are agreed as to the seriousness of the problem of juvenile
delinquency and are agreed as to the importance of strength-
ening the influence of the home and of encouraging a sense
of responsibility on the part of parents with respect to the
20 House Bill No. 191, Seventy-second General Assembly May 22, 1961.
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behavior of their children. The only question is whether or not
this bill will contribute to that objective.
The sponsors of this bill are to be commended for having
brought it forward for legislative and executive consideration.
They believe that it would cause parents to exercise greater
control over their children and hence to reduce the number
of acts of vandalism.
On the other hand, the opponents of the bill seriously ques-
tion whether it will have that effect. They point out that its
burden will fall particularly on low income families and that
it could conceivably limit the liability of parents who are
financially able to pay considerably more than $250 for damage
caused by their children. They also stress the fact that the
bill may lead to added strain in families where relationships
are already tense and might even give to troublesome delin-
quents a weapon against their parents which they would not
hesitate to use.
Among the responsible agencies and officials which have
registered their opposition to this legislation are: The Chair-
man of the Temporary Commission on Youth and Delinquency,
the Chairman of the State Youth Commission, the New York
City Bar Association, the New York State Bar Association,
the Jewish Child Care Council, the United Parents Associa-
tion, the New York City Council of Churches and the Citizens
Committee for Children of New York City.
I must conclude that the value of this legislation has not
been established.
The Bill is disapproved.21
A Bill on the same general subject was introduced at the 1964
session of the New York legislature. It passed the Assembly, but
failed to pass the Senate.
The Committee on the Domestic Relations Court of the Bar
Association of New York in commenting on the proposed legis-
lation said,
The proposed bill would change these common law rules by
imposing, in effect, an absolute liability on the parent for any
injury to property resulting from any malicious, wilful or
unlawful act of his child, without regard to whether or not
the parent had any knowledge of any dangerous propensities
of the child or whether or not the parent exercised reasonable
restraint over the child. In the view of this Committee the bill
is unduly harsh and inflexible and is unrealistic. Although
2 l Public Paper of Governor Harriman (1956), p. 240.
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one of the purposes of the measure is undoubtedly to deter
acts of juvenile delinquency which result in damage to prop-
erty of others, it would not appear that any great degree of
deterrence will be effected where liability is imposed without
respect to whether the parent has been at fault.
The Committee is concerned with the possible impact of the
bill on matters before the Children's Court. Experience in
that Court shows that many acts of delinquency stem from a
disturbed parent-child relationship. In such cases, arbitrarily
penalizing the parent for the acts of the child not only will
not provide a deterrent against repetition on the part of the
child but may well aggravate the existing antagonisms be-
tween the parent and child which lie at the source of the
child's delinquent conduct. The corrective measures which
the Children's Court attempts to apply to these situations
may well be nullified by the additional penalty on the parents
which the proposed measure imposes.
A later and similar bill was passed by the New York Legisla-
ture and was vetoed by Governor Nelson Rockefeller on April 23,
1964. In his veto message, Governor Rockefeller said,
This bill would amend the Family Court Act to impose
liability upon the parent of a 10 to 16 year old child for prop-
erty damages caused by such child, in amounts less than $250.
Under present law there is no general liability on the part
of a parent as such, for the civil wrongs of his child. Liability
may be imposed upon the parent, however:
(1) Where the relationship of master and servant exists and
the child is acting within the scope of his authority ac-
corded by the parent;
(2) Where a parent is negligent in entrusting to the child
an instrument which, because of its nature, use and pur-
pose, is so dangerous as to constitute, in the hands of
the child, an unreasonable risk to others;
(8) Where a parent is negligent in entrusting to the child
an instrumentality which, though not necessarily a danger-
ous thing of itself, is likely to be put to a dangerous use
because of the known propensities of the child
(4) Where the parents' negligence consists entirely of his
failure reasonably to restrain the child from vicious con-
duct imperilling others, when the parent has knowledge
of the child's propensity toward such conduct, and
(5) Where the parent participates in the child's tortious act
by consenting to it or by ratifying it later and accepting
the fruits. Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 519
[Vol. 53,
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(2d Dept., 1937); and see Staruck v. County of Otsego,
285 App. Div. 476, (3rd Dept., 1935).
This Bill is intended to extend these common law rules of
liability. Without reaching its merits, it must be disapproved
because of serious deficiencies in its present form. Chief among
these is that, while the bill purports to impose liability for
acts of vandalism, in its present form it would hold a parent
responsible for all property damage caused by his child,
without regard to fault or malice. In addition, it would limit
to $250 the damages which may be awarded against a parent,
although at common law there is no such limit. There is also a
serious question whether the grant of jurisdiction over such
proceedings to the Family Court exceeds the constitutional
authority of that Court (Article VI, Section 13).
The Attorney General, Citizens Committee for Children and
United Parents Association, among many others, recommend
disapproval.
The bill is disapproved.
Yet, in spite of this sober reflection at the gubernatorial level
and the cautionary words of Bench and Bar plus the protestations
of social and civic groups, the trend toward the imposition of
vicarious liability upon parents increases in scope and degree.
Ironically in some states22 where parental liability legislation has
been enacted, the child is an adult at age sixteen or seventeen
for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction, yet under the statutes the
parents are vicariously liable civilly for the child's criminal acts.
The efficacy of this type of legislation is questionable on socio-
economic grounds. Studies have shown that many families of de-
linquent children have a low income level, with more than an
average number receiving economic assistance. Recovery in
such cases would be limited or even impossible. Comprehensive
insurance coverage for children has been suggested.23 This
would place an untenable financial burden on many parents in
the low economic category.
It is difficult to determine the salutory effect of parental lia-
bility legislation on juvenile delinquency. Comparable data over
a long period of time are often not available even for the same
court; good data for a control group of courts not having parental
liability laws are often not available to indicate the net impact
22 Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Vermont,
and Wisconsin.23 Note, 36 Wash. L. Rev. 330 (1961).
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of the parental liability laws. Without the latter, where states
with parental liability laws have experienced an increase in de-
linquency, one cannot answer the question as to how much
greater the increase might have been without the laws.
Statistical data that are available, 4 however, do not seem to
support the contention that parental liability laws have reduced
delinquency. Delinquency data for 1957 through 1962 are avail-
able for courts in 16 states that had enacted parental liability
laws in 1957 or before. The year 1957 was selected because com-
parable data were available for the 16 states beginning with that
year. Similar data for 19 states that enacted parental liability laws
in 1957 or before were not available. While the 16 states ex-
amined were not necessarily statistically representative of all the
states having parental liability laws, they do comprise a sizeable
proportion of the total group. The following are the percetnage
changes from the previous year in delinquency cases disposed
of by the courts in the 16 states combined, as compared with the
United States as a whole:
Percent change from previous year
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Courts in 16 States Combined +3.4 ±6.7 ±8.7 -1.1 ± 7.5
U. S. Total ±7.5 +2.1 ±5.6 -1.4 ±10.3
As a group, the percentage changes for the courts in the 16
states combined, while varying somewhat for individual years,
show the same general trend in delinquency cases as do all courts
in the United States. The percentage increase over the entire
period (1957-1962) was 26.1 percent for the United States and
27.5 percent for the courts in the 16 states combined. With but
few exceptions, most states where parental laws have been
passed, show an increase in delinquency cases disposed of by the
courts in one or more years subsequent to the passage of the law.
The above relates to delinquency as a whole. Even where some
data are available for the specific offenses of delinquency most
directly related to parental liability laws (vandalism, damage
to property or acts of carelessness or mischief), there is no evi-
dence of a reduction following the passage of parental liability
laws. In one state for example, where the parental liability law
was passed in 1955, acts of damage to property increased from
24 juvenile Delinquency Studies Branch, Division of Research, Children's
Bureau, Welfare Administration, Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
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618 in that year to 1,000 by 1962. In another state which passed
a law in 1956, acts of carelessness or mischief (including vandal-
ism) increased from 1,672 in 1956 to 3,151 in 1961 (the latest
year for which data have been published). In still another state
which passed a law in 1953, court cases of damage to property
increased from 502 in 1955 to 785 in 1959. Statistics in articles
appearing in some popular magazines concerning parental liability
laws and purporting to show a percentage reduction in malicious
destruction of property are often misleading. These statistics
are for the most part based on very small numbers, in one in-
stance,-reduction of 69 cases to 30 cases, and in a large metro-
politan area, from 244 cases to 192 cases. In another instance a
reported 50 per cent reduction in property damage cases in-
volved the difference between 12 cases one year and 6 cases the
year following.
In seeking a cure for juvenile delinquency many experimental
remedies are suggested and some even applied. The remedial
effect of parental liability legislation does not appear to be sur-
viving the test of time, yet the passage of such laws goes on apace.
The concept of state indemnification to persons injured or dam-
aged by the criminal acts of others may be the next step in
alleviating an unreasonable vicarious liability for the acts of an-
other by mere reason of consanguinity.
APPENDIX
Parental Liability Legislation
Maximum
State Stat. Ref. Year Liability Age
Alaska 4  Ch. 98 and 1957, $500 18
34-50-020 1962
Arizona'. 3, 4  12-661 1956 500 Minor
Arkansas4  50-109 1959 300 18
California3, 4  Civil Code 1955 300 Minor
1714.1
Colorado4  41-2-7 1959 300 18
Connecticut1' 2, 3, 4  52-572 1955, 750 Minor
1959
Delaware4  10-3923 1958 800 18
Florida4  45-20 1956 300 18
Georgia' , 3, 4  105-113 1956 Open 17
Hawaii, 4 330-3 1955 Open Minor
1965]
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Idaho4  6-210 1957 300 18
Indiana , 4  2-520 1957 500 18
Kansas4  38-120,121 1959 300 18
Louisiana , 4  2318 1952 Open Minor
Maine , 4  166-22-A 1959 250 7-17
Maryland (Montgomery County) 4 26-76(i) 1959 500 Minor
Michigan". 4  27 A.2913 1962 500 18
Montana 4  61-112.1,2 1957 300 18
Nebraska4  48-801 1951 Open Minor
Nevada3 4  41-470 1957 300 18
New Jersey5  18:14-51 1903 Open Pupil
New Mexico4  22-21-1 1957, 500 18
1959
North Carolina 4  1-538.1 1961 500 18
North Dakota3 4  32-03-39 1957 300 18
Oklahoma4  23-10 1957 300 18
Oregon3 4  90-770 1959 100 18
Rhode Island , 3 4 9-1-3 1956 250 Minor
South Dakota4  14-0309.1 1957 300 18
Tennessee 4, 7 37-1001-3 1957 300 18
Texas3, 4  5923-1 1957 300 10-18
Vermont3 4  15-901 1959 250 17
Virginia6  8-654.1 1960 200 18
Washington3 4  Ch. 99 1961 300 18
West Virginia3, 4  5482.2,3 1961 300 18
Wisconsin4  331.035 1957, 300 Minor
1961
1 Includes personal injury liability.
2 Includes motor vehicle liability.
3 In addition to any other civil liability.
4 Property liability.
5 School vandalism only-by pupil.
6 Public property only.
7 Due care and diligence of parent or guardian is a bar to recovery.
